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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear this
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 1988).
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The district court dismissed Plaintiffs' Amended
Complaint on statute of limitations grounds. The ruling was
announced from the bench on June 20, 1988, and memorialized in an
order which was signed and entered on July 14, 1988.

R. 72-74.

On August 16, 1988, thirty-three days after the entry of the
order, plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal and a "Notice of
Extension of Time to Appeal."

R. 75-78.

The "Notice of

Extension of Time to Appeal" was treated as a Rule 4(e) Motion to
Extend the Time to Appeal.

R. 97-98.

On September 12, 1988, the district court denied the
Motion for Extension of Time to Appeal and on the next day
plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal of the district court's
denial of its motion to extend the time to appeal.

R. 89-92.

The Order denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Extension of Time to
Appeal was signed and entered on September 19, 1988.

R. 97-98.

The denial of Plaintiffs' Motion for Extension of Time to Appeal
is the subject of this appeal.-

The appeal from the July 14, 1988 Order dismissing
plaintiffs' Amended Complaint was dismissed by this Court as
untimely. (Case No. 880386).
-1-

STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
There is only one issue on appeal:

Did the district

court abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs' motion for
extension of time to appeal?
APPLICABLE LAW
Rule 4(a) of the RuLes of the Utah Supreme Court
provides:
Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case
in which an appeal is permitted as a matter of right
from the district court to the Supreme Court, the
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with
the clerk of the district court within 30 days after
the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed
from; provided however, when a judgment or order is
entered in a statutory forcible entry or unlawful
detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule
3 shall be filed with the clerk of the district court
within 10 days after the date of entry of the judgment
or order appealed from.
Rule 4(c) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court
provide:
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order.
Except as provided in Paragraph (b) of this rule, a
notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a
decision, judgment or order but before the entry of the
judgment or order of the district court shall be
treated as filed after such entry and on the day
thereof.
Rule 4(e) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court
provides:
Extension of time to appeal. The district court,
upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause, may
extend the time for filing a notice of appeal upon
motion filed not later than 30 days after the
expiration of the time prescribed by Paragraph (a) of
this rule. Any such motion which is filed before
expiration of the prescribed time may be ex parte
unless the district court otherwise requires. Notice
of any such motion which is filed after expiration of
-2-

the prescribed time shall be given to the other parties
in accordance with the district court rules of
practice. No extension shall exceed 30 days past the
prescribed time or 10 days from the date of entry of
the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature Of The Case, Course Of The Proceedings And The
Disposition Below.
Plaintiffs filed their original complaint on June 24,

1987 and an amended complaint on July 9, 1987.

R. 2-19.

Defendants moved to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds.
In response to defendants1 Motion to Dismiss,

R. 26-38.

plaintiffs filed a memorandum and affidavit in support.
46-50.

R.

The motion was heard on June 20, 1988 by Judge Dennis

Frederick.

R. 72. The district court considered the motion as a

motion for summary judgment and based on the record and the
absence of any material issues of fact, dismissed the complaint.
R. 72. The ruling was announced in court and a proposed order
was mailed to plaintiffs1 counsel on June 22, 1988.

R. 72-74.

The order of dismissal was entered on July 14, 1988.
R. 73-74.
1988.

The order became final and appealable on August 15,

On August 16, 1988, plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal

and a "Notice of Extension of Time to Appeal.

R. 75-78.

On

September 12, 1988, Judge Frederick considered the "Notice of
Extension of Time to Appeal" as a Rule 4(e) motion to extend the
time to appeal.

After consideration of the affidavit of Peter

Waldo and the arguments of counsel, the district court denied
plaintiffs' motion for extension of time to appeal.

-3-

R. 89.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts involved in this case are as follows:
1.

On June 24, 1987 plaintiffs filed their complaint

and on July 9, 1987 plaintiffs filed their first amended
complaint.

R. 2-10 and 11-19.
2.

Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiffs1 Amended

Complaint on the grounds that the plaintiffs' claims were barred
by the applicable statute of limitations.
3.

R. 26-33.

In response to defendants1 Motion to Dismiss,

plaintiffs filed a memorandum that was supported by the Affidavit
of Walter P. Larson dated October 16, 1987. R. 46-50.
4.

After considering the memoranda, affidavits and

arguments of counsel, Judge Frederick granted defendants1 Motion
to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint and announced this
decision from the bench at the hearing held on June 20, 1988.

R.

72.
5.

A copy of the order, which was signed by Judge

Frederick on July 14, 1988 without any modifications, was mailed
to plaintiffs' counsel, on June 22, 1988.
6.

The Order of Dismissal was signed and entered on

July 14, 1988.
7.

R. 73-74.

R. 73-74.

Pursuant to Rule 4(a) of The Rules of the Supreme

Court, plaintiffs had thirty (30) days to file a Notice of Appeal
with the clerk of the district court.

-4-

8.

The thirty days expired on August 15, 1988 without

plaintiffs having filed the requisite notice or motion for
extension of time.
9.

R. 73-78.

On August 16, 1988, after the time period had

expired, plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal and "Notice of
Extension of Time to Appeal."
10.

R. 75-78.

Plaintiffs admit in their Notice of Appeal and

"Notice of Extension of Time to Appeal" that they were
2/
represented by counsel during the appeal period.R. 75-78.
11.

On September 12, 1988, Judge Frederick denied

plaintiffs1 Motion for Extension of Time to Appeal (mistitled
"Notice of Extension of Time to Appeal") and announced this
ruling from the bench.
12.

R. 89.

Plaintiffs were represented by counsel, John J.

Borsos, at the September 12, 1988 hearing.
13.

R. 89.

On September 14, 1988, plaintiffs filed a Notice

of Appeal to this Court, which appeal is the basis of this
proceeding.

R. 90-92.

This Notice of Appeal included an

Affidavit of Walter P. Larson, dated September 13, 1988.

R.

90-95.

Defendants believe that paragraphs 13 through 15 of
plaintiffs' Statement of Facts are misleading. Those
statements refer to the pro se filing of a Notice of Appeal,
yet the record discloses no absence of counsel during the
appeal period. Furthermore, the August 16, 1988 Notice of
Appeal was signed by John J. Borsos on behalf of Walter P.
Larson, pro se and John J. Borsos formally appeared as
plaintiffs' counsel on September 8, 1988. R. 77-78 and 80.
Peter Waldo has never withdrawn as plaintiffs' counsel.
-5-

14.

The September 13, 1988 Affidavit of Walter P.

Larson was not presented to the district court and was not
3/ R. 89-95,
considered by the district court*15.

On September 19, 1988, the district court signed

the Order Denying Plaintiffs1 Motion for Extension of Time*

R.

97-99.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The only issue properly presented for appeal is whether
the district court abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs1
motion for an extension of time to appeal after the notice of
appeal was filed late.

Not only did the district court act well

within the boundaries of its discretion, but its ruling in
denying plaintiffs' Motion for Extension of Time was clearly
correct.
Plaintiffs have failed to make a sufficient showing of
excusable neglect.

The only reason given for the late filing

—

that plaintiffs' attorney did not know the last day in which
notice of appeal could be filed -- indicates inadvertence and
oversight on the part of plaintiffs' counsel.

Therefore, the

district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
motion.

2/

Defendants object to the consideration of paragraph 19 of
plaintiffs' Statement of Facts since those facts were not
considered by the district court in ruling on plaintiffs'
Motion for Extension of Time.
R. 89 and 90-95. See Point
IIA, infra.
-6-

Defendants petition the Court to strike Section II of
plaintiffs1 brief.

That section addresses the district court's

ruling on defendants1 motion to dismiss. An appeal on that
decision has already been dismissed by this Court.

Furthermore,

plaintiffs did not raise any issue addressed in Section II as an
issue in their docketing statement.

These arguments are not

properly before the Court.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME.
Rule 4(a) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court,

provides that a "notice of appeal . . . shall be filed with the
clerk of the district court within 30 days after the date of
entry of the judgment or order appealed from."

The filing of a

notice of appeal within thirty days of the entry of judgment is a
jurisdictional prerequisite essential to securing appellate
review.

Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 676 P.2d

952, 958 (Utah 1984).

S^ee Browder v. Director, DepTt of

Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 264-65 (1978); Mayfield v. United
States Parole Comm'n, 647 F.2d 1053, 1055 n.5 (10th Cir. 1981)
(per curiam).
The court may grant an extension of time in which to
file a notice of appeal "upon a showing of excusable neglect or
good cause . . . ."

Utah RSC 4(e).

However, this Court has

declared that standard "necessarily a strict one."

Prowswood,

Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 676 P.2d at 959. See

-7-

Varian-Eimac Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570-71 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989) (Utah appellate courts have consistently held that
jurisdiction is terminated once a statutory time limit is
exceeded).

Furthermore, a district court's factual determination

in applying that standard will not be overturned absent an abuse
of the court's discretion.

Buckley v. United States, 382 F.2d

611, 615 (10th Cir. 1967), cert, denied, 390 U.S. 997 (1968);
Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 676 P.2d at 961.
The Advisory Committee Notes to Rules of the Utah
Supreme Court, Rule 4 states:
Excusable neglect or good cause under [Rule 4] refers
generally to an extraordinary circumstance that
prevented the movant from filing a timely notice of
appeal and not to inadvertence or oversight on the part
of counsel or to the failure of the client to authorize
an appeal.
The Supreme Court of Utah has reaffirmed that
"[iInadvertence or mistake of counsel does not constitute the
type of unique or extraordinary circumstances contemplated by
[the] strict standard" of Rule 4.

Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain

Fuel Supply Co., 676 P.2d at 960.
In this case, plaintiffs have failed to show any
extraordinary circumstances.

The only reason offered for the

late filing is that the attorney "did not know when the last day
to file an appeal was."

Appellants' Brief at 9 (emphasis added).

There is no dispute that plaintiffs' attorney was present in
court on June 20, 1988 when the district court made its ruling
and that both plaintiffs and their attorney were aware of that

-8-

ruling.

Rule 4(c) of Rules of the Utah Supreme Court allows for

a notice of appeal to be filed prior to the entry of an order.
The appeal therefore could have been filed immediately after the
4/ The decision
..
district courtfs decision was announced in court.to wait until the last possible day —
calculate what that day was —

and to then fail to

amounts to nothing other than

inadvertence and oversight.
In their brief, plaintiffs also claim that their
attorney stated that "fthe court had not yet signed the order so
there was no need to file a notice of appeal.1" Appellants1
Brief at 9 (citing R. 94). This statement indicates that counsel
was aware of the opportunity to file but rather chose to wait
until after the entry of the order.

This further indicates

inadvertence, not extraordinary circumstances.
The affidavit of Peter Waldo, filed in support of
plaintiff's Motion for Extentions of Time, states in paragraph 4
that "[d]ue to lack of communications with the Larsons, an appeal
was not filed by our office."

R. at 87-88.

This statement also

demonstrates oversight and inadvertence on the part of
plaintiffs' attorney.

Lack of communication between counsel and

client does not give rise to a showing of extraordinary
circumstance.

See Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co.,

This appeal is taken from an order entered September 19,
1988. The notice of appeal was filed prior to the entry of
the order on September 13, 1988, and only one day after the
hearing. Plaintiffs are obviously aware of the provisions
of Rule 4(c).
-9-

676 P.2d at 960-61.

The Waldo affidavit actually supports the

district courtfs ruling.
The affidavit of Walter Larson upon which plaintiffs
now rely so extensively, see Appellants' Brief at 8, 1f 19, was
not before the district court at the time of the hearing on
September 12, 1988. The Larson affidavit is dated September 13,
1988, one day after the district court decided this matter.

The

affidavit was filed as an attachment to the notice of appeal.
Since this affidavit was not considered by the district court it
is not properly part of the record on appeal and cannot be
considered by this Court in determining whether the lower court
abused its discretion.
The affidavit, even if considered, does not demonstrate
excusable neglect.

Plaintiffs lament that they had moved from

the state, that the California family home was threatened with
foreclosure, and that one of the family members was suffering
blindness and a nervous breakdown while another had sustained a
traumatic neck injury.

Appellant's Brief at 10.

Furthermore,

plaintiffs complain that there is now a conflict between
themselves and the attorney who represented them throughout the
time period for appeal.

However, these facts are irrelevant to

the issue of excusable neglect.

As the Tenth Circuit stated in

Buckley, "[t]he multiplication of inadequate reasons for holding
[counsel's] neglect excusable serves only to emphasize their
inadequacy."

Buckley v. United States, 382 F.2d at 615.

-10-

A.

Rule 58A(d) Does Not Affect The Time For Filing A
Notice Of Appeal,
Plaintiffs rely heavily on Rule 58A(d), Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure.
judgment.

However, that rule deals with the entry of a

In this case, the defendants had no obligation under

Rule 58A(d) since no judgment was entered.

The court simply

granted their motion to dismiss.
Furthermore, the rule itself states expressly that "the
time for filing a notice of appeal is not affected by the notice
requirement of this provision."

Utah RCP 58A(d).

It is clear

that Rule 58A(d) does not extend the filing period, nor does
non-compliance give rise to excusable neglect.
The case of McGarr v. United States, 736 F.2d 912 (3rd
Cir. 1984), relied on by plaintiffs is distinguishable.

In

McGarr, the attorney had written two letters to the court seeking
an extension of time to appeal prior to the expiration of the
period.

The court considered the letters as ex parte

applications for extensions of time.

Id. at 918.

In this case,

plaintiffs' attorney did nothing prior to the expiration of the
period to perfect the appeal.

Plaintiffs1 reliance on Graco

Fishing & Rental Tools Inc. v. Ironwood Exploration, Inc., 735
P.2d 62 (Utah 1987) is similarly misplaced.

In that case this

Court did not address the extension of time issue but instead
remanded "to allow the respondents the opportunity to oppose the
appellants1 motion for an extension of time . . ., and for the
district court to then rule on the motion".

-11-

Id. at 63. Also

Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Utah Depft of Transp., 589
P.2d 782 (Utah 1979) is distinguishable.

In that case

appellant's notice of appeal from an administrative decision was
found timely.

Id. at 783.

In Buckley v. United States, 382 F.2d at 613, the
defendant's attorney attempted to argue that failure to receive
notice gave rise to excusable neglect.

The Tenth Circuit

unequivocally stated that counsel's "claim that his neglect was
caused by waiting for a notice from the clerk is not a basis for
a plea of excusable neglect." Id. at 614. There -- as here —
"not only . . . was [there] no clear abuse of the trial judge's
discretion, but . . . his ruling was clearly correct." _Id. at
615.
B.

Plaintiffs Were Represented By Counsel At All Relevant
Times.
Page 15 of the plaintiffs' brief suggests that their

late filing should be considered under a more lenient standard
because, subsequent to the inaction of their attorney, they filed
a notice of appeal pro se.

However, plaintiffs admit that during

the period of time during which an appeal could have been filed
they were represented by counsel.

In fact, the notice of appeal

that was filed was actually signed by the attorney on behalf of
the plaintiffs.

Furthermore, whether the appeal was pro se or

not, plaintiffs' failure to make a motion before the end of the
filing period extinguished any right to appeal.
United States Parole Comm'n, 647 F.2d at 1055.

-12-

Mayfield v.
See Shah v.

Hutto, 722 F.2d 1167, 1168 (4th Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert,
denied, 466 U.S. 975 (1984) ("proceeding pro se does not change
the clear language" of Rule 4(a)); superseding Shah v. Hutto, 704
F.2d 717 (4th Cir. 1983); United States ex. rel. v. Leonard
O'Leary, 788 F.2d 1238, 1240 (7th Cir. 1986) (per curiam)
(circuits agree that proceeding pro se does not warrant exception
to Rule 4(a)).
II.

NO ISSUE RELATING TO THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE IS
BEFORE THE COURT.
A.

Section II Of Plaintiffs' Brief Should Be Stricken.
The district court granted defendants1 motion to

dismiss on the basis that plaintiffs1 causes of action were
barred by the statute of limitations.

In Section II of their

brief, Appellants' Brief at 17-21, plaintiffs undertake to argue
that

ff

[i]ssues of fact and a correct view of the law of

limitation of actions . . . require reversal of the order of
dismissal."

Plaintiffs then argue that the district court's

decision should be reviewed as though the order of dismissal was
5/
on appeal before this Court.An appeal of the order of dismissal has already been
dismissed by this Court.

Case No. 880386.

As part of that

ruling, this Court also denied plaintiffs1 motion to consolidate

Plaintiffs also contend that a statute of limitations
defense cannot be raised by a motion to dismiss. This
position is contrary to well-established legal authority.
See 2A Moorefs Federal Practice 11 12.10. See In re Estate
of Sullivan, 506 P.2d 813, 817 (Wyo. 1973); Kellar v.
Snowden, 87 Nev. 488, 489 P.2d 90, 92 (Nev. 1971).
-13-

the appeals.

By including this argument in their brief,

plaintiffs are attempting to obtain indirectly what they could
not obtain directly.

Furthermore, the issue has been waived

since plaintiffs failed to include any reference to the issue in
their docketing statement.

Any argument relating to a statute of

limitations issue is waived.

See Reese Enter., Inc. v. Lawson,

220 Kan. 300, 553 P.2d 885, 899 (Kan. 1976) (point asserted for
first time in appeal brief must be stricken).

Defendants submit

that Section II of plaintiffs1 brief should be stricken since the
issue addressed therein is not properly before the Court.
B.

The District Court Properly Granted Defendants' Motion
To Dismiss.
Since plaintiffs have argued the district court's grant

of dismissal, defendants provide the following summary of
arguments for this Court.
Plaintiffs filed their complaint containing four causes
of action on June 24, 1987.

All four causes of action related to

the terms of an alleged verbal agreement whereby defendants
supposedly agreed to submit a debtor's plan in the Chapter 11
bankruptcy, In re Larson Ford Sales, Bankruptcy No. 82C-02186,
pending in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Utah.

All four causes of action were governed by a four year

statute of limitations.

U.C.A. S 78-12-25(1) and (3) (1953, as

amended).
Plaintiffs' First Claim for Relief was for breach of
the alleged verbal agreement in that defendants had filed a

-14-

creditor1s plan rather than a debtor1s plan of reorganization.
The creditor's plan which the defendant did submit was confirmed
on June 10, 1983 and notice of entry was sent on that same day to
all parties by the Bankruptcy Court.

As a generally accepted

rule, a cause of action upon a verbal contract arises at the time
of the contract's breach.

Upland Indus. Corp. v. Pacific Gamble

Robinson Co., 684 P.2d 638, 643 (Utah 1984).

Since the

creditor's plan was actually confirmed on June 10, 1983, any
breach of the alleged verbal agreement occurred on or before that
date.

Plaintiffs' claim is time barred since June 10, 1983 is

more than four years prior to the commencement of this action.
Plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action, interference with
business relations, sounded in intentional tort.

The statute of

limitations in intentional torts begins to run when the tort or
the activity leading to the tort occurs.
Utah 17, 484 P.2d 160, 162 (Utah 1971).

Obray v. Malmberq, 26
The complaint stated

that the acts underlying this cause of action were done "in order
that the Defendant Stephen Wade could submit a creditors plan in
Chapter 11 bankruptcy."

First Amended Complaint, 11 13. By

plaintiffs' own admission, all of the alleged tortious conduct
occurred prior to the defendants' submission of the creditor's
plan.

Thus, the alleged facts that form the basis for this cause

of action also occurred prior to June 10, 1983.

Hence this cause

of action is also time barred.
Plaintiffs' Third and Fourth Causes of Action included
claims for breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment,
-15-

conversion and punitive damages.

These claims were based on

conduct which was alleged to have occurred during and in
connection with the verbal contract negotiations.

Since the

verbal contract was alleged to have been entered into in January
1983, these causes of action are also time barred.
Plaintiffs also complain that the court granted the
motion to dismiss without requiring that the creditors1 plan of
reorganization be placed into evidence.

A copy of the notice of

confirmation was attached to defendants1 memorandum in support of
their motion to dismiss.

The notice was mailed to all parties

involved in this bankruptcy proceeding on June 10, 1983.
Plaintiffs cannot claim that they did know of any breach prior to
June 24, 1983, because the notice states expressly that a
creditors' plan had been confirmed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendants ask the court to
affirm the district court's denial of plaintiffs1 Motion for
Extension of Time.

Furthermore, defendants ask the court to

strike Section II of plaintiffs' brief.
DATED this ,-rLJ> day of August 1989.
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Gary E. Jubber
Patrick L. Anderson
FABIAN & CLENDENIN,
a Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Defendants/
Respondents
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this USday

of August, 1989

I caused to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid, four true
and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondents to:
L. Edward Robbins, Esq.
1200 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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